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Abstract
This article is an adaptation of a lecture given at St. Antony's College, Oxford on
5 July 2003 in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the Centre for Russian and East
European Studies at Oxford University. The author evaluates the effect of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights on Russian law and politics. Russia has been
a signatory to the Convention for five years.The author argues that the full power
of the Convention as a force for reform in Russia was unanticipated at the time of
Russia's accession. Nevertheless, the Convention has been the catalyst for substantial
reforms, especially in the criminal justice system.The author examines these reforms
as well as the increasing number of cases in which Russia is a respondent before the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Drawing on interviews, the Court's
statistics and his own experience training Russian human rights la-wyers, the author
charts the rapid growth in Russia of interest in the Strasbourg process.
Over the last few years, I have traveled to Moscow with an international team
of lawyers to teach Russian lawyers the legal mechanics of how to bring a case
before the European Court of Human Rights. The Russian Federation has
now been a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which
that Court interprets, for five years. On our visits, we also advise these lawyers
on particular cases they wish to bring to the Court, which sits in Strasbourg.
So, I have enjoyed a rare double view of Russia's emerging post-Soviet human
rights record from both the elevated perspective of legal abstraction and the
hard work of very real, very human, individual cases. Since our first trip in
2000, I have also observed how the European Court's caselaw has influenced
Russian law and politics and, of course, vice versa.
This work makes me optimistic about the gradual improvement ofhuman
rights in Russia. Thanks in no small part to this human rights treaty, Russia
has effectively abolished the death penalty. A growing body of European hu-
man rights caselaw is now part of Russia's own legislative framework, cited
in Russian judicial opinions, and noticeably apparent in the new Criminal
Procedure Code. I also have substantial grounds for pessimism.The European
Court is currently flooded with Russian applications that could overwhelm
the Strasbourg process. And even when that process works, the delayed and
The opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not reflect the position of the
United States Department ofJustice.
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paltry relief it renders individual victims sometimes almost seems to mock the
egregious human rights violations they present. The Court has so far failed
to dehver a single judgment about Chechnya-the single worst human rights
atrocity in Russia today.
Early in his successful campaign to become Russia's second democrati-
cally elected president, Vladimir Putin introduced a strange phrase into the
pohtical lexicon: "the dictatorship of law".' Putin repeatedly used the phrase
in his speeches and writings on democracy and law, pronouncements that are
at once both encouraging and chilling. His use of democratic concepts often
left unclear in what manner he thought them best applied.2 Did the Russian
president mean the Rule of Law, or a more frightening, bureaucratized rule
through laws?
Whatever else he may have meant, President Putin's famous "Dictatorship
of Law" was not intended to empower human rights crusaders. Putin meant
to restore federal authority over Russia's regions, part of what he called the
strengthening of vertical executive power.' But as Putin simultaneously sought
closer ties to Europe, he has found himself pressed to extend that phrase to meet
the demands of Russia's membership in the Council of Europe (of which the
European Court is a part) to reform the administration ofjustice on all levels.
And that has opened the opportunity for a dictatorship of law, to borrow his
unfortunate phrase, of a different sort.
First, let me draw you a thumbnail sketch of the most powerful human
rights system currently in existence in the world today. Russia has accepted
the obligation "[to] secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms" described in the Convention.4 Russia also recognized the authority of
the European Court of Human Rights to enforce this obligation, and the right
of individuals-not just Russian citizens, but any human being--to petition
the Court alleging to be the victim of a violation of the Convention by the
Russian state. Such a right is virtually unheard of in international law, which
is typically more concerned with sovereign states than with individuals.5
1. Open Letter fromVladimir Putin to RussianVoters, 25 February 2000, available at: <http:
//putin2000.ru/07/05.html>.
2. "In a non-law-governed, i.e., weak, state the individual is defenseless and not free. The
stronger the state, the freer the individual [emphasis in original]. [...] I know that there are
many now that are afraid of order. But order is nothing more than rules. And let those
who are currently engaged in substituting concepts for one another, trying to pass off the
absence of order for genuine democracy-let them, I say, stop looking for hidden dirty
tricks and trying to scare us with the past. 'Our land is rich, but there is no order in it,'
they used to say in Russia. Nobody will ever say such things about us in future." Id.
3. See, e.g., Chapter Eight: "The Federal Reforms of Vladimir Putin", in Jeffirey Kahn, Fed-
eralism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia, Oxford 2002.
4. Art. 1, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR).
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Of course, such a right would be empty if the Convention were merely
aspirational in tone. Fortunately, that is not the case.The Convention establishes
an absolute right to life.6 There is an absolute right against torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment by the state.7 There is a right to liberty and security of
the person, which provisions govern criminal arrest and detention, involuntary
commitment, detention of minors and deportation.The Convention requires
fair and public hearings in both civil and criminal cases, the presumption of
innocence and certain mirmum rights to criminal defendants.9 There is a right
to privacy and family life in the Convention, as well as to religious freedom,"
freedom of expression, 2 association," freedom from discrimination, 4 and the
list goes on. Crucially, the Convention explicitly establishes the right to an ef-
fective remedy before a national authority for violations of all of these rights."i
There is even a procedure for the Court to expedite urgent cases and request
interim measures of a member-state to ensure the safety of an applicant who
complains of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.16
These are not abstract or lofty proclamations. The Court's cases have
concerned issues of habeas corpus, speedy trials, self-incrimination, surveillance
and wiretapping, legal aid, abortion, paternity and custody disputes, the right
to work and to a state pension, the rights of homosexuals, conscientious objec-
tors, membership in political parties and trade unions. Russia's moratorium on
death sentences, begun under Boris Yeltsin and still in effect, is a direct result
of Russia's signature to Protocol Six of the Convention. 7
Russian membership in the Council of Europe and compliance with
the Convention has not been easy.The Council's rapporteurs have repeatedly
criticized Russia's foul human rights record, the generally poor condition of
5. D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, fifth edition, London 1998, 142 n.2,
("For the most part, however, the individual remains an object, not a subject, of interna-
tional law [...].").
6. ECHR, Art. 2.
7. ECHR, Art. 3.
8. ECHR, Art. 5.
9. ECHR, Art. 6.
10. ECHR, Art. 8.
11. ECHR, Art. 9.
12. ECHR, Art. 10.
13. ECHR, Art. 11.
14. ECHRArt. 14.
15. ECHR, Art. 13.
16. Rules of Court 39 (interim measures), 40 (urgent notification of an application), and 41
(case priority).
17. Russia signed, but did not ratify, Protocol 6 to the European Convention, which abolishes
the death penalty. However, a moratorium on executions begun by President BorisYeltsin
as part of Russia's bid for membership in the Council of Europe is still in effect.
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state institutions, and the weak state of the rule of law.18 One of the most ob-
vious causes of concern by other member-states, and one about which I shall
say more later, is the continuing large-scale violence in Chechnya.19 On 30
June 2003, the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention ofTorture
published its first public report on the Russian Federation following eleven
visits throughout Russia.2' The report documents deplorable conditions at
facilities run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the
Federal Border Service, the military and psychiatric hospitals and makes rec-
ommendations for their immediate improvement. 21
Access to the Court has also not been easy for Russian applicants. In the
first three years after Russia ratified the Convention in 1998, not a single Russian
case was declared admissible by the Court for a hearing on its merits.This has
18. See Rudolf Bernhardt et al., "Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Rus-
sian Federation with Council of Europe Standards", 15 Hum. Rts. L.J. 1994,249,250-295.
See also Bill Bowring,"Russia's Accession to the Council of Europe and Human Rights:
FourYears On", 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 2000,362.
19. See, e.g., Sergei Kovalev (an outspoken human rights leader and former political prisoner),
"Putin's War," N. Y Rev. Books, 10 Feb. 2000, at 4-8. On 6 April 2000, the excesses of the
Second Chechen War resulted in suspension of Russia's voting rights in the Council's
Parliamentary Assembly, a sensational walk-out from that body by the Russian delega-
tion, and vituperative diplomatic exchanges on both sides. For an excellent summary of
the Parliamentary Assembly's actions that April, see "Credentials of the Delegation of the
Russian Federation", Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc.
No. 8956 (25 Jan. 2001), available at: <www.stars.coe.fr/doc/doc0l/edoc8956.htm>
(19 Jun. 2001). For unofficial transcripts and summaries of the debates, see "Provisional
Version of the Report of the Debate of 06 April 2000 at 10 A.M.", available at: <http:
//stars.coe.fr/verbatim/20002/e/0002061000e.htm> and "Provisional Version of the
Report of the Debate of 06 April 2000 at 15 P.M.", [sic] available at: <http://stars.coe.fr/
verbatim/20002/e/0002061500e.htm>.
20. See "Press Release from the Council of Europe Spokesperson and Press Division, Ref:
355a03", "First Council of Europe Anti-Torture Committee report on the Russian
Federation published," 30 June 2003, available at: <http://press.coe.int/cp/2003/
355a(2003).htm>. The report is available in English at: <http://www.cpt.coe.int/
documents/rus/2003-30-inf-eng.htm>. The Russian response is available at: <http:
//www.cpt.coe.int/documents/rus/2003-31-inf-eng.htm>.
21. The Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) began its
visits to Russia in 1998.The visit that is the subject of the published report was carried
out from 2-17 December 2001. Six members of the CPT, with interpreters and staff,
visited 31 facilities in Moscow city, Khabarovsk Territory, and Primorskii Territory. The
CPT reported a "very high standard" of cooperation by some Russian authorities, while
cooperation by other Russian authorities "could hardly be described as satisfactory".The
CPT also reported at least one "serious incident" during its visit to one facility, when a
recording device was discovered in an interview room.The CPT was not always afforded
unencumbered access, despite provisions for unannounced inspections of certain facilities.
Although a full account of the methodology and findings of the CPT is impossible here, it
should be clear that the CPT found ample evidence to warrant immediate recommenda-
tions for basic improvements in the accommodation and treatment of detained persons.
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not been for a lack of complaints, however. By the end of 1999, Strasbourg had
received almost 2,000 applications; another 2,312 applications were lodged the
next year. Only in 2 001, when over 6,300 applications were sent to Strasbourg,
were two found to meet the Court's rigid requirements for hearing a case on
its merits.' Most of the applications were rejected on technical grounds that
reflect the lack of attention paid to educating Russia's capable and growing
cadre of human-rights lawyers (not to mention the population in general, since
representation by a lawyer is not required by the Court). 3
Those numbers are, slowly, starting to improve. Last year, some 4,000 ap-
plications came from Russia, almost thirteen per cent of all applications that
year from the Council of Europe's forty-five members. Twelve were declared
admissible. So far this year, four applications have been declared admissible. 24
These numbers are more promising than they may appear. First, an increas-
ing number of applications are being referred to the Russian Government for
comment before the Court makes a decision on admissibility.This is an indica-
tion of the gravity of the complaints and also evidence of the Court's persuasive
powers, since it is a step that frequently leads to an immediate ameliorative
response by the Russian authorities. 25 In a way, Russia is trapped: unwilling to
22. European Court of Human Rights: Survey of Activities: 2002, 33. Information document
issued by the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights (Provisional version).
A pdf version of this comprehensive report is available at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/
Eng/InfoNotesAndSurveys.htm>.
23. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited by Article 35 of the Convention, which sets forth
certain admissibility criteria.Two common grounds for holding a complaint inadmissible
are failures to exhaust domestic remedies and to comply with the Court's six-month time
limit (from the date on which a final decision wx as taken on the matter) for filing an ap-
plication. Four other grounds for inadmissibility are ratione personae (personal jurisdiction
and standing requirements), ratione loc and ratione temporis (member-states are liable only
for violations of the Convention occurring within the state's jurisdiction after the state
has assumed its obligations under the Convention), and ratione materiae (complaints must
relate to Convention rights and freedoms regarding which the member-state has assumed
responsibility). UnderArt. 35,5 3, the Court may declare inadmissible an application that it
considers "incompatible with the provisions of the Convention," "manifestly ill-founded",
or an "abuse of the right of application". For an excellent and thorough discussion of these
technical requirements, see Luke Clements, Nuala Mole and Alan Simmons, European
Human Rights:Taking a Case Under the Convention, London 1999.
24. European Court of Human Rights: Survey of qctivities: 2002, 33.
25. For example, in the case of Burdov v. Russia, discussed below, the Russian government at-
tempted to moot a Russian pensioner's application regarding failure to pay compensation
and enforce civil judgments by finally paying compensation on the eve of an admissibility
decision by the Court, coldly suggesting that Burdov could make a claim in the Russian
courts if he felt entitled to any damages for the untimely enforcement of his judgments.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the amount offered-which was made only after Burdov's
application was communicated to the Russian Government by the Court-in no way
afforded adequate redress, specifically since it did not involve any acknowledgment of the
violations alleged.The Court held the complaint admissible and later found a violation of
the Convention in a decision on the merits.
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quit one of the only European organizations willing to accept it as an equal
member, the Russian government finds itself increasingly called to meet the
requirements of membership. It is a carrot and a stick, all in one.
These statistics also suggest that recent popular opinion polls that allege
general disinterest for human rights among Russians do not give the whole
picture.16 There is acute interest among Russian lawyers in bringing cases."
Their numbers are growing and they are getting better at it. Lawyers are the
natural engine for catalyzing interest in human rights and the rule of law.
A more important statistic for Russia than the number of admissible
cases, is the number ofjudgments cases decided on their merits. Beginning
last year, three Russian judgments have been handed down by the Court, all
against the Russian government.28 Each case focused attention on fundamental
problems in Russian law.
The first judgment against Russia was the Burdov case.29 Burdov was a
Russian pensioner awarded state compensation for his services during the
Chernobyl disaster. Burdov never received a kopeck, even after winning a
civil suit against the local authorities in 1997. Only after the Court requested
a response to his complaint from the Russian Government were funds sud-
denly found to pay him. The Court unanimously held that Burdov's property
interests and right to a fair trial had been violated by the State's failure to
guarantee execution of Burdov's court judgment. Complaints about the non-
enforcement of domestic judgments account for over half of the applications
received by the Court from Russia.3" The right to a fair trial means nothing if
judgments are not enforced.
The second case was brought by a banker in Magadan named Kalashnikov.31
Accused of embezzlement, he spent nearly five years in pre-trial detention
waiting for trial. The conditions of his detention were abominable, but fairly
26. See, e.g.,Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, "Russian Public Opinion on Hu-
man Rights and the War in Chechnya", 18 Post-Soviet Affairs 2002, 271-305.
27. Perhaps in recognition of the increasing number ofRussian applicants and lawyers pursuing
cases before the Court, the Council of Europe has published a two-volume compendium
of the Court's caselaw and useful documents in Russian. See Evropeiskii sud po pravam
cheloveka: Izbrannye resheniia v 2 tomakh, Moskva 2000.
28. This figure was accurate on 5 July 2003, when this lecture was given. As of 14 Novem-
ber 2003, four more judgments have since been handed down by the Court, all against
the Russian government. Summaries of these cases can be found in a postscript to this
lecture.
29. Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 59498/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 May 2002).This was also the first
application declared admissible against Russia. See Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 59498/00
(Eur. Ct. H. R. 6 Jun. 2001).
30. Interview with legal expert of the Eur. Ct. of H.R. (27 Jun. 2003) (cited on condition of
anonymity).
31. Kalashnikov v. RussiaApp. No. 47095/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 Jul. 2002).
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typical. In October of last year, the Court again unanimously ruled that both
the conditions and length of his detention, and the length of the criminal
proceedings as a whole, violated his rights.
The Posokho[' case, decided this past March, is the third judgment against
Russia.32 A court-composed of ajudge and two lay judges-found Posokhov
guilty of smuggling large quantities of vodka. Posokhov appealed, alleging that
the lay judges had not been chosen at random or for a limited term of appoint-
ment, as required by law.The European Court found a violation of Posokhov's
right to a hearing by a fair and impartial tribunal established by law.
The lawyers who fight these cases warn their clients that the process is
slow and the sums awarded are often paltry. Burdov received £3000 for his
troubles; Kalashnikov was awarded £8000 and Posokhov a mere £500. But
still the cases keep coming--a sign that vindication in court is as important to
Russian victims as remuneration by the state. And, as you can see, these cases
go to the heart of Russian legal reform.
What sorts of cases are coming out of Russia now? In summer of 2003,
the Court held a hearing on the merits of an application by a woman detained
in a mental hospital without court order.33 Ajudgment will likely be published
in the fall of 2003. 3' At the end ofApril, the Court declared admissible a case
from Kaliningrad on prison conditions,judicial review, and the right to legal
assistance. 31 In May of 2003 alone, the Court issued decisions to admit three
Russian cases. One is from Chukotka concerning the excessive length of civil
proceedings. 36 Another is from a Latvian national who alleges the unlawful
confiscation of his property at Sheremetyevo-1 Airport-a case that should
interest anyone planning a trip to Russia. 37 And the third was brought by
Vladimir Gusinskii, whose arrest, detention and self-imposed exile followed
by loss of his stake in NTV is well known.38 Another well-known case-that
32. Posokhov v. Russia, App. No. 63486/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 Mar. 2003).
33. The case is Rakevich v. Russia. A hearing was held 17 June 2003. See Press release issued
by the Registrar of the Court on that date.The admissibility decision is: Rakevich v. Russia,
App. No. 58973/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 Mar. 2002).
34. In a judgment issued on 28 October 2003, the Court found a violation of Convention
Art. 5, 5 1 (Right to liberty and security of the person) because the applicant's detention
did not follow the procedure prescribed by Russian law, and Art. 5, § 4 (Right to speedy
court proceedings to determine the lawfulness of detention) because Russian law did not
entitle the applicant to a direct right of appeal to a court of law to test the lawfulness of
her detention. The Court ordered the award ofE3000, plus any chargeable tax, in respect
of non-pecuniary damage. See Rakevich v. Russia, App. No. 58973/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 28
Oct. 2003).
35. Mayzit v. Russia, App. No. 63378/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 Apr. 2003).
36. Kormacheva v. Russia, App. No. 53084/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 6 May 2003).
37. Baklanov v. Russia, App. No. 68443/01 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 6 May 2003).
38. Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 22 May 2003).
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of environmentalist Aleksandr Nikitin-has been communicated by the Court
to the Russian government for comment and a decision should be forthcom-
ing soon.39 An application by Grigorii Pasko has also been accepted by the
Court.4
These judgments are individually noteworthy, but their real power lies in
their effect on the Russian legal system as a whole. In the hierarchy of Russian
law, the Convention and the caselaw that interprets it are on a par with the
Russian Constitution itself.' The legal norms established by the Convention
as interpreted by the Court are considered superior to Russian federal, repub-
lican and provincial law. This is no small matter. The Constitutional Court,
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have all cited European Court
cases-and not just those directly involving Russia-in their own rulings and
decrees.4
2
The power and importance of this interaction between Russia's domestic
courts and the European Court cannot be understated. By signing the Conven-
tion, Russia has agreed to adopt an international set oflegal standards and norms
39. Interview with legal expert of the Eur. Ct. of H.R. (27 Jun. 2003) (cited on condition of
anonymity). After a complaint has been registered by the Court, the admissibility process
is as follows: the President of one of the Court's Chambers (seven-member panels; the
forty-member Court rarely sits in plenary session) assigns a judge to act as a Rapporteur
on the complaint (ideally, a member of the Court with some experience with the do-
mestic law in question). Based on the Rapporteur's report, the Chamber may declare the
complaint inadmissible or it may communicate the complaint to the member-state con-
cerned, requesting information. Following the government's and complainant's responses,
an admissibility hearing may be scheduled.
40. Konstantin Katanyan,"lnterview with Grigoriy Pasko:'Grigoriy Pasko Prepares for Exams"',
Vremia MN 29 January 2003 (available in translation on:Johnson's Russia List, #7060, 13
February 2003).
41. See RF Constitution Arts. 15 §4,17 §1,46 §3, and 55 §§1 & 2. See also RF Law ofTrea-
ties, Art. 5 §3.
42. See, e.g.,the Constitutional Court case"O proverke konstitutsionnosti polozhenii punktov
1 i 3 chasti pervoi stat'i 232, chasti chetvertoi stat'i 248 i chasti pervoi stat'i 258 Ugolovno-
protsessual'nogo kodeksa RFSFR v sviazi s zaprosami Irkutskogo raionnogo suda Irkustkoi
oblasti i Sovetskogo raionnogo suda goroda Nizhnii Novgorod", Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo
Suda RF (herinafter VKS) 1999 No. 4,40-49. See also the Constitutional Court case "po
delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti polozhenii chasti pervoi stat'i 47 i chasti vtoroi stat'i
51 Ugolovnogo-protsessual'nogo kodeksa RSFSR v sviazi s zhaloboi grazhdaninaVI.
Maslova", VKS RF 2000 No. 5,46-52.
For a summary of the holding in the Maslova case, as well of other published and
unpublished dispositions of the RF Constitutional Court, see Ger P van den Berg, Con-
stitution of the Russian Federation Annotated with Summaries of Rulings and Other Decisions of
Constitutional (Charter) Courts: 1990-2001,27 Review of Central and East European Law 2001
No. 2/3 (Irkutsk Court Ruling at 355-356). In addition to his chronological summaries of
a decade of CC cases,Van den Berg has also arranged the CC dispositions as annotations
to the 1993 RF Constitution, see Constitutional Court:A Decade of Legal Reforms-Part 2:
The Constitution of the Russian Federation Annotated, 28 Review of Central and East European
Law 2002-3 No.3/4,273 ff.
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as its own, prioritizing them above the legislation passed by its own Federal
Assembly.That is a dictatorship of law if ever there was one.What makes such
oversight palatable to Russian politicians and jurists is not only the European
Court's care to extend a margin of appreciation to Russian practices. Russia's
highest courts have embraced this caselaw and made it their own.43 By so do-
ing, European standards on a variety of fundamental issues have been imported
into Russian law. In a very real sense, they are Russian law.
New Russian legislation has also been directly affected by the Conven-
tion.The most striking example is the new Criminal Procedure Code. Under
the previous, Soviet-era Code, for example, the decision to detain a suspect
(podozrevaemyt) or an accused (obviniaemyi) rested with the procurator, ,iot with
a judge. The new Code requires a court of law to make that determination ac-
cording to strict standards.That difference makes all of the difference, and it is
a change brought about by the obligations Russia undertook when it signed
the Convention.
Aware of how difficult this change would be for procurators to swallow,
Russian lawmakers planned to phase this element of the Code into practice
eighteen months after the rest of the Code entered into effect inJuly 2001. But
that spring the Russian Constitutional Court, making repeated direct refer-
ences to the Convention in its decision, struck down the transitional period,
and ordered the entire Code into effect at the same time.44
One great effect of the Convention is its ability to jolt a conservative Rus-
sian judiciary into action. Shortly after this decision was published, I met with
five Russian judges who specialized in criminal cases. They were extremely
critical of the decision. One argued that judicially-supervised detention would
require a doubling of judges in the system. Another maintained that such a
shift of power from prosecutor to judge was at present impossible. Neither set
of officials, he said, had the education, experience, or mentality for such an
abrupt change.4 Without pressure from the European Court, filtered through
the Russian Constitutional Court, such basic reforms might still be distant
aspirations."
43. This is in sharp contrast to the very mixed reception given the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights in the United States Supreme Court on 26 June
2003. Compare Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct.
2472,2481 & 2483 (2003) (citing with approval the European Court's decisions that state
restrictions on consensual homosexual conduct violated the European Convention on
Human Rights) with Justice Scalia's dissent, at 2495 (referring to "the [Supreme] Court's
discussion of these foreign views" as "meaningless [and] ... [d]angerous dicta.")
44. Constitutional Court case 0 proverke konstitutsionnosni statei 90,96,122, i 216 Ugolovno-
protsessual'nogo kodeksa RSFSR v sviazi s zhalobami grazhdan S.S. Malenkina, R.N.
Martynova i S.V Pustovalova", 14 March 2002; available at: <http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/
p6-02.htm>. See also Ger P. van den Berg, op.cit. note 42.
45. Interview with judges from Azov, Rostov, Ulyanovsk, andVologda, in Ann Arbor, MI (Mar.
2002).
29 Review of Central and East European Law 2004 No. 1
It must be said, however, that the concerns of these Russianjudges are not
without some basis.A 1992 Russian law on habeas corpus-formally establish-
ingjudicial review of arrest, pre-trial detention and other police practices-was
killed in the cradle by Soviet-era judicial and police personnel opposed to the
reform.4" Russian lawyers, whom I have met, see on a daily basis the difference
between the law as written and the law as applied. Criminal justice systems
the world over have a strange feature, and Russia's system is no exception.The
official on the lowest rung of the ladder-the police officer on the street-is
first to make the most crucial and difficult decisions: to arrest, to search, to
interrogate, to shoot. Most command-and-control systems work on the op-
posite principle: generals think, soldiers act.
Nowhere is this fact more obvious than in Chechnya, on which subject I
would like to make a few closing comments. Large-scale violence in Chechnya
is a massive stumbling block to Russia's acceptance as a coequal in the Council
of Europe. Lord Judd, reporting on the conflict in April 2000, was dismayed at
how the European Court of Human Rights had been sidelined there.48
This situation has changed for the better. Roughly 170 applications have
been received by the Court concerning events in Chechnya since April 2000.
The bulk of them allege violations of the Convention by the Russian military
for killings, torture, extrajudicial detention and destruction ofproperty.A number
of the applications refer directly to the detention camp at Chernokozovo.49
Thus far, six applications from Chechnya have been declared admissible
by the Court for hearing on their merits.50 The applications concern bom-
46. According to the US Department of State, under the new Criminal Procedure Code, the
Procuracy has opened 25% fewer criminal cases, the courts have rejected 15% of requests
for arrest warrants, and the number of suspects held in pretrial detention dropped 30%.
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices-2002: Russia 2 (31 Mar. 2003).
47. See, e.g., Todd Foglesong, "Habeas Corpus or Who Has the Body? Judicial Review of
Arrest and Pretrial Detention in Russia", 14 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1996, 541.
48. "1 find it unbelievable that our governments have not so far found a way of referring
some of the allegations and issues to the court. That is feebleness at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.What on earth is the point of having these institutions if our govern-
ments are not prepared to act? [...] I conclude by saying to my Russian friends that the
Council of Europe is about human rights or it is about nothing. Unless you feel a genuine
commitment to the battle for human rights, you are wasting your time by coming to
this Assembly". Reports of the Debate of the 2000 Session-2nd Part (6 April 2000, 10AM),
available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/asp/doc/
ListCR(SQL).asp>; see also Hum. Rts. Watch World Rep. 2001, supra note 7, 319.
49. Interview with legal expert of the Eur. Ct. of H.R. (27 Jun. 2003) (cited on condition of
anonymity).
50. Khashiyev &Akayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57942/00 & 57945/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 Dec.
2002); Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 57949/00
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 Dec. 2002); Isayeva v. Russia,App. No. 57950/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 Dec.
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bardments of a refugee convoy and the village of Katyr-Yurt and the killing
of civilians in a Grozny suburb.
Any day now," the Court is expected to release a decision on the admis-
sibility of an application brought by thirteen Chechens last October. 2 The case
is called Shamayet' and Twelve Others v. Georgia and Russia. Georgian authorities
had arrested thirteen men, alleging them to be Chechen guerrillas, and Russia
demanded their extradition. Fearing the worst, the applicants' representatives
sent an emergency notice to the Court alleging that their rights to life (Art.
2) and to be free of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 3) were
in jeopardy if extradited to Russia and that their detention in Georgia was
in violation of Art. 5, % 1, 2, & 4. The Court immediately used its Rule 39
powers to request that the Georgian authorities stay extradition until Russia
gave official assurances that the suspects would be treated decently and their
right to contact the Court would be unabridged. 53 The Court also notified
the Russian government of the detainees' application under Rule 40 (urgent
notification of an application) and gave the case priority in its docket under
Rule 41. Nevertheless, five of the men were extradited to Russia days after
the Court acted on the applicants' urgent request. It appears, however, that the
Court's immediate action did result in a stay of extradition for the remaining
eight detainees, who remained inTblisi even after the expiration of the Court's
interim measures under Rule 39.54 As to the five applicants who were extradited
despite the Court's interim measures, the Russian authorities gave guarantees
to the Court of unhindered access for the applicants to appropriate medical
treatment, legal advice, and to the Court itself. The Russian authorities also
assured the Court that the applicants would not face capital punishment and
that their health and safety would be protected.55
Political scientists are virtually unanimous on the importance of the
rule of law for democracy, and rightly so. But how do you build the rule of
law? How does it get put in place and how does it remain there? These are
51. The Court handed down its decision, holding the application admissible and joining the
Russian Government's preliminary objections to the merits, on 16 September 2003. As
of 14 November 2003, only the French version of the decision was available from the
Court. See Deuxi~me Section D&ision sur la Recevabilit de la requite no 3 6378/02 prsente
parAbdul-Vakhab Shamayev et 12 autres contre la G.orgie et la Russie, 16 septembre 2003. See
Postscript for a brief discussion of this decision.
52. See press releases issued by the Registrar of the Court on 10 October, 6 November, and 26
November 2002.The case is Shamayev & 12 others v. Georgia & Russia,App. No. 36378/02
(Eur, Ct. H.R. filed 4 Oct. 2002).
53. See supra footnote 16.
54. Press Release Issued by the Registrar of the Court, 29 April 2003, available at: <http:
//www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2OO3/aug/announcehearingsseptember2OO3htm>.
55. Press Release Issued by the Registrar of the Court, 26 November 2002, available at: <http:
//www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2002/nov/shamayev 26 .11.2002.htm>.
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as much philosophical questions as practical ones. The European Court prods
and pushes Russia toward needed reforms, but it does so through the filter
of Russian law, imposing on Russia only what Russia has agreed to accept. It
is a strange dictatorship of law, one perhaps not contemplated when Russia
signed the European Convention on Human Rights. But it is also one which,
if it does not overwhelm the European system, has great potential to benefit
the Russian one.
Postscript
At the time the lecture upon which this article is based was given, only three
judgments had been handed down by the Court against Russia. Following
the delivery of this lecture, the European Court has issued four more judg-
ments against Russia. Below is a brief summary of the holding in each case.
The complete judgment in each, like all admissibility decisions and judgments
issued by the Court, are available via HUDOC, at the Court's website: <http:
//www.echr.coe.int/>.
The Court issued judgments in two cases involving the non-execution
of civil judgments. See Ryabykh v. Russia, App. No. 52854/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
24 Jul. 2003); Timofeyev v. Russia, App. No. 58263/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 Oct.
2003). Both cases concerned the applicants' unsuccessful attempts to collect
judgment debts won against the state. Citing Burdov v. Russia, the Court found
a violation of Art. 6, § 1 in both cases and a violation of Art. 1 of Protocol
No. 1 in Timofeyev. In Timofeyev, the Court noted the numerous and lengthy
delays, adjournments and obstructions the applicant suffered in his attempts
to enforce a civil judgment awarded in his favor. In Ryabykh, the Court noted
the detrimental effects of the Russian legal procedure of supervisory review
(nadzor) on the applicant's rights under the Convention, in particular on the
fundamental principles of resjudicata and the finality ofjudgments. Neverthe-
less, in both cases the Court made no award of just satisfaction because the
applicants had failed to submit an itemized accounting of claims for financial
compensation within the Court's required time-limits.
In Smirnova v. Russia,App. Nos. 46133/99 & 48183/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 24
Jul. 2003), the Court found violations of the Convention in a case in which
two applicants alleged excessively long pre-trial detentions and subsequent
re-detentions in the same criminal case; one applicant was detained for over
four years in total and the other applicant more than one and one-half years
in total. One applicant also alleged the unlawful withholding of her national
identity paper-the "internal passport" required for employment, medical care,
currency exchange, domestic travel, etc. The Court found a violation of Art.
5, §§ 1 & 3 in the repeated re-detaining of the applicants in the course of one
criminal investigation. The Court also found a violation of Art. 6, § 1 due to
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the unreasonably long period of the legal proceedings. Finally, the Court found
that the withholding of one applicant's internal passport worked a violation
of Art. 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life) be-
cause the document was essential for everyday life in Russia; its deprivation,
therefore, represented a continuing interference with the applicant's private
life. The Court awarded the applicants £3500 and C2000, respectively, in just
satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage and £1000 jointly in respect
of costs and expenses.
In Rakevich v. Russia,App. No. 58973/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 Oct. 2003), the
Court found two violations of the Convention in a case involving a woman
detained in a mental hospital against her will.The Court held that the applicant's
right to liberty and security of the person under Art. 5, § 1 had been violated
because the applicant's detention did not follow the procedure prescribed
by Russian law. Although a judge was required to decide whether Rakevich
should be detained in the hospital within five days of receiving the hospital's
application, the Russian court took thirty-nine days to decide, during which
time Rakevich was detained in the mental hospital. The Court also found a
violation of Art. 5, § 4 (Right to speedy court proceedings to determine the
lawfulness of detention) because Russian law did not entitle the applicant
with a direct right of appeal to a court to test the lawfulness of her detention.
The Court ordered the award of E3000, plus any chargeable tax, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
An interesting development should also be noted in the admissibility de-
cision in Shamayev and Twelve Others v. Georgia and Russia.As noted above, the
Court held the application admissible against both Georgia and Russia for a
future hearing on the merits. In addition, the Court ordered that a fact-finding
mission be sent to both countries (under Rule 42 § 2 of its Rules of Procedure)
to take evidence from certain applicants who have been extradited to Russia
and from the applicants who remain in the custody of Georgia.
Although the mission was originally scheduled to take place during the
last week of October 2003, the Georgian government requested and received
an adjournment of the mission in light of the general election held in that
country on 2 November 2003 (the request, sent by fax, expressed concern for
the personal security of members of the mission). The mission to Russia was
also adjourned following a last-minute communication to the Court by the
Russian government that the Stavropol Regional Court (under whose juris-
diction the extradited applicants are detained) had refused to grant the mission
access to the detainees at the present stage of its proceedings.The preliminary
reaction of the Court to this bold refusal is instructive:
The Court has informed the Russian Government that, in these circumstances, and owing
in particular to the lateness with which the Court was given notice thereof, it will have
to adjourn the mission to Russia. It also informed the Government that the local court
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was contacted purely out of courtesy. The issue of access to the applicants is a matter of
international law-in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, which,
under Russian law, takes precedence over domestic law-and, therefore, falls to be decided
solely by the European Court of Human Rights.The Court drew attention to Article 38
§ 1 of the Convention, which provides that the State concerned is to furnish all necessary
facilities for the effective conduct of any investigation undertaken by the Court. Moreover,
Article 34 of the Convention requires the High Contracting Parties not to hinder in any
way the effective exercise of the right of individual application.
56
The fact-finding mission to both countries has been rescheduled for
early 2004.
56. "Fact-finding Missions in the Case of Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia,"
Press Release Issued by the Registrar, # 528, 24 October 2003, available at: <http://
www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2003/oct/Fact-findingmissionShamayev.htm>.
